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While the size and speculative nature of land transactions in the wake of energy,
food and climate crises have surprised observers, the reasons for partial
implementation of many land developments remain largely unexamined. This
contribution investigates trajectories of land acquisition and enclosure by
analyzing four acquisition processes in Indonesia – those associated with rice,
oil palm, Jatropha and carbon sequestration – considering their implications for
comparative studies elsewhere. The paper ﬁnds that current patterns of land
use change represent a continuation of ongoing land transformation processes.
It describes the logic leading to partial realization of large-scale schemes.
Highlighting the importance of interactions between formal and vernacular rural
land development processes, the essay concludes that many large-scale schemes
are better understood as virtual land acquisitions.
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Introduction
The magnitude and speculative nature of land transactions following the advent of
energy, food and climate crises have surprised observers. Some analysts have
suggested that up to as much as 227 million hectares (ha) have been sold, leased or
licensed in large-scale land deals over the last decade (Oxfam 2011). This ‘new
bubble’ involving speculative investments and large-scale land acquisitions (or ‘land
grabs’) has inﬂated as investors seek to exploit new market opportunities for
food crops, industrial cash crops and bio-energy production along with new
enclosures of forest land for carbon sequestration (De Schutter 2011, Deininger
2011). Careful analysis, however, suggests that we need to avoid taking these ﬁgures
at face value. To be sure, it is tempting to lump together disparate land transactions
as ‘land grabs’. This might suggest a kind of teleology: large corporations take over
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large areas for agricultural commodity production for export and for carbon
sequestration while displacing peasantries in the local domain. This may resonate
well with classical descriptions of the ‘slow dissolution of the peasantry’ as they
are dispossessed by ‘big land estate and large-scale agriculture’ (Akram-Lodhi and
Kay 2009, 7); and indeed, this dynamic can be found in speciﬁc cases. Yet only
a fraction of land developments associated with these transactions are ever
implemented. According to calculations from the World Bank (2011, 224), only
30 percent of developments are in the initial implementation stage. To date
the reasons for postponement and failure of these projects remain largely
unexamined.
This paper seeks to understand the logic underlying several diﬀerent enclosure
processes, examining the dynamics shaping each in turn. We also address the
question of partial and non-implementation of apparently promising land
acquisition plans. The cases discussed are from Indonesia, the largest country in
Southeast Asia, where extravagant macro-economic, agribusiness and green agendas
circulate around the new opportunities. According to reports, state planners have
allocated up to 3.5 million ha for new food estates (Media Indonesia 2011), and there
are plans for a further seven million ha of new oil palm plantations by 2020 (USDA
2010), alongside nine million ha of new timber plantations by 2016 (Obidzinski and
Dermawan 2010). In addition the Ministry of Forestry aims to expand forest
concession for non-gas and oil mining, to encompass 2.2 million ha of ‘forest land’
(Jakarta Globe 2010). This sits alongside ambitions to develop 1.5 million ha of
Jatropha to meet the aspiration of making Indonesia ‘the world’s ﬁrst biofuel
superpower’ (I-Newswire 2010). Meanwhile, donors and carbon investors compete
to advance around 44 carbon sequestration (REDDþ) projects that aim to mitigate
climate change (REDD-I 2011).
To investigate trajectories of land acquisition and enclosure, this paper presents a
historical analysis of four large-scale processes – those associated with rice, oil palm,
Jatropha and carbon sequestration. Utilizing an actor-oriented approach, we explore
the gap between plans and implementation. We advance four arguments. First, we
question the degree to which ‘land grabs’ to meet the new ‘green’ and food security
agendas really amount to a radical shift (e.g. GRAIN 2008). We argue against
regarding these acquisitions and green projects as a single, coherent process that
explains all manner of political-economic programs across a wide variety of settings.
Rather, we argue for understanding current changes as a continuation or re-
intensiﬁcation of ongoing disaggregated processes that are transforming ‘outer
island’ spaces.
Second, we place current development plans in the context of a longer history.
This longer historical context suggests that in many cases land acquisition plans and
developmental scenarios will continue to be problematized, resisted and only
partially realized as they bump into existing land uses, patterns of resource access,
ecologies and rapid ﬂuctuations in world commodity prices. Despite this history
of failed large land schemes, as developmental narratives take up new global
concerns they continue to legitimize large-scale land acquisitions in the same
landscapes.
Third, we demonstrate that rural landscapes are marked by overlapping land
claims, with competing indigenous and commercial smallholder land uses, or
concession licenses and land use plans. In this sense, rural landscapes work as a
palimpsest; a parchment where the eﬀects of successive inscriptions and erasures
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associated with ‘legal’ and ‘vernacular’ processes can still be perceived.1 Vernacular
land allocation and transaction processes are embedded in, and constrained by,
locally speciﬁc political and market-based dynamics shaped by local understandings
of identity and entitlement.2 While vernacular processes shaping land access and use
can be decisive for land tenure in ‘outer island Indonesia’, formal land acquisition
processes also remain critical. The dynamic interaction between these processes in
each case aﬀects the extent to which legalized acquisition processes lead to enduring
land use changes.
Fourth, we argue that in many cases, regardless of legal provisions to the
contrary, actors engage in land acquisition processes without the intention to use
the land for the purpose mentioned in the plan or development license.3 Here we
introduce the term ‘virtual land grabbing’ to characterize situations where, behind
a fac¸ade of land acquisition for a stated purpose, there lies an agenda to
appropriate subsidies, obtain bank loans using land permits as collateral, or
speculate on future increases in land values. Our argument here points to the
centrality of agendas of land control – projects which attempt to ﬁx or consolidate
forms of access to land-based wealth – as the key to understanding these
phenomena (Peluso and Lund 2011). Distinguishing between ‘real’ and ‘virtual
land grabbing’ requires a conceptual understanding of land acquisition as a
process. In the case of ‘virtual grabbing’ only a few initial stages of land
acquisition or enclosure processes occur; just suﬃcient to enable speciﬁc actors to
pursue their own interests, which may or may not depend upon land use changes
actually taking place.
The ﬁndings in this paper, based on our research in Indonesia, are highly
signiﬁcant for wider discussions of ‘land grabbing’. First, the essay highlights the gap
between plans as stated and schemes as implemented, showing that the mere
proclamation of a land acquisition in accordance with global discourses on food,
climate and energy crises can be suﬃcient to proﬁt particular actors. Whether land
schemes end up being developed or not, these acquisitions are important, given that
they lead to the reworking of spatial plans and the issuing of land use permits.
Moreover, working in a dialectical fashion, one ‘failed’ scheme can later end up as a
‘success’: by serving as the basis for the next set of schemes, the failed scheme plays a
key part in the transformation of rural landscapes. In this sense, all land initiatives
aﬀect the ongoing construction of new patterns of ownership and control over
nature in frontier areas, working to reconﬁgure or to entrench political power, and
providing new opportunities for particular actors while marginalizing others. Our
paper also highlights how an analysis in terms of virtual land acquisitions might
help to explain the gaps between plans and implementation well beyond Indonesia.
1B. de Sousa Santos (2006) has used the palimpsest as a metaphor to characterize the intricate
ways in which very diﬀerent political and legal cultures and very diﬀerent historical durations
are inextricably intertwined in contemporary Mozambique.
2Here we use the term ‘vernacular’ to refer to socially embedded land allocation and transaction
processes that do not conform to state regulations (cf. Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2007). Often
there is a great deal of ambiguity regarding rights of access and compliance with rules during
such processes, particularly as outcomes emerge through negotiations and disputes that involve
the adaptation of customs and norms with powerful dominant interests and the impact of state
licensing processes. For a discussion relevant to the Indonesian context, see McCarthy and
Warren (2008).
3Land acquisition for purposes other than listed on the license or for speculative purposes is
technically illegal under Indonesia’s agrarian law, even though this is rarely enforced.
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Documentation on land grabs in other countries shows similar ﬁndings: land
acquisition may not be as massive as suggested (Cotula et.al. 2011)4; the acquisition
process is often decentralized with local actors playing a key role (Borras and Franco
2010, Deininger 2011); and planned projects are often only partially realized, or
may be unlikely to succeed (Ness et al. 2010). Further, existing policies to avoid
speculative uses – such as virtual land acquisitions – tend to be poorly implemented
(Deininger 2011). Finally, this essay demonstrates that a broader consideration of the
functions of land appropriations, including consideration of virtual land acquisitions,
reveals the need to reconsider the impact and signiﬁcance of ‘land grabs’ alongside the
policies driving the expansion of corporate agriculture and ‘green appropriations’.
This paper investigates trajectories of land acquisition and enclosure associated
with development schemes, virtual land grabs and green acquisitions. It advances the
four key arguments (outlined above) through an investigation of four large enclosure
processes – the processes associated with rice, oil palm, Jatropha and forest
sequestration. Before considering these four large enclosure processes in turn, the
next section will discuss the centrality of state developmental rationalities that target
the ‘outer islands’ for large land projects in Indonesia.
Land acquisition and enclosure in Indonesia’s outer islands
To explore our case studies of large enclosure processes in Indonesia and to
understand how this leads to our conclusions, we need to ﬁrst discuss the history of
projects to turn nature into economic or green resources. First, it is important to
distinguish between the densely populated centre of the country, Java and Bali, and
the islands that have customarily been referred to as ‘the outer islands’.5 Java and
Bali are the centers of intensive rice cultivation and are places where land tenure
is relatively clearly deﬁned. In contrast, Sumatra and Kalimantan are large islands
with huge natural wealth, while the smaller islands of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT)
are much drier and less fertile. Farmers in these ‘outer islands’ have combined
various forms of swidden cultivation with cash crop production. In many situations
these diverse livelihood approaches have been a ‘rational economic and environ-
mental choice for farmers’ (Mertz et al. 2009, 259).
Over the longer term, macro-economic policies have focused on the use of forests
and other land types in the ‘outer islands’ as catalysts for a structural transformation
of the Indonesian economy and as sources of wealth accumulation for privileged
politico-bureaucratic actors. We can distinguish a sequence of six transformational
historical moments.6 First, there was an initial colonial phase focused on plantation
development, centred on the plantation belt of North Sumatra. After the late 1960s,
the rise of markets for timber and the emergence of technologies to exploit forests on a
large-scale led to a focus on industrial logging. Next, the third stage focused on
transforming ‘forest’ into food crop development areas, supported by a developmental
discourse advocating self-suﬃciency in rice. This project formed part of a state
development strategy that involved a large-scale colonization project – the well-known
transmigration program. Fourth, in the 1980s Indonesia began to transform logging
and food estate areas in Sumatra and Kalimantan into oil palm and timber
4i.e. in terms of the GRAIN deﬁnition (GRAIN 2008).
5The inside-outside distinction is typical for a ‘colonizer’s model of the world’ (Blaut 1993).
6See McCarthy (2012) which provides a more detailed discussion of this case.
524 John McCarthy et al.
plantations, supported by a developmental discourse that advocated increasing non-
oil export earnings and diversifying employment opportunities. Rising world crude oil
prices and recognition of climate change have now precipitated a ﬁfth stage. This has
inspired the Indonesian government’s policy for biofuel production in 2006, with
Jatropha as a ‘green champion’ biofuel crop. Finally, as markets have emerged for the
carbon locked up in forests and peat lands, the prospect has arisen of green
appropriations for carbon sequestration. This paper analyzes the latter four processes
in this sequence: rice for food security; oil palm for economic growth; Jatropha for
green biofuel; and forest projects for carbon sequestration. In all four phases, a strong
macro-policy narrative has legitimized large land acquisitions and state involvement.
This paper uses these four large enclosure processes as case studies, to investigate
trajectories of land acquisition and enclosure, and to advance our four key arguments.
Despite shifting policies over time, Indonesian governments have always
supported transformative processes in landscapes. Successive state planners have
conceived ambitious national projects to turn nature into economic resources, re-
molding landscapes as well as ‘indigenous’ land uses in desired ways (Scott 1998,
McCarthy and Cramb 2009). Early colonial administrations appropriated land to
facilitate the objective of developing Western enterprises. At this time land alienation
was ‘never a problem’, as it was facilitated by colonial land law (Furnivall 1956, 337).
After independence, state policies and laws continued to facilitate the allocation of
land to plantations, and were reworked to support changing national development
strategies.7 Advancements in technology and infrastructure enabled new resources
to be accessed and used, creating new market opportunities and developing land
markets (Wallace and Williamson 2006). This led to shifts in what is valuable and
hence worth extracting or otherwise using (Schmink and Wood 1992). One land
development project therefore gives way to another.
There are several reasons why Indonesian land development policies continue to
target the outer islands. Firstly, the outer islands are perceived as having abundant
uncultivated or ‘marginal’ land, and low population densities. Additionally,
customary land rights in these areas tend not to be formally recognized; state
institutions are weaker, and legal provisions governing land transaction tend to be
poorly implemented. Many resource-rich areas in the outer islands retain a ‘frontier’
character: they are spaces in rapid transition, places where the state institutions
and legal frameworks that might protect local inhabitants tend to be weak. More
recently, even those outer islands that are relatively resource-poor have become the
focus of plans for resource exploitation, with growing attention to ‘marginal land’.
Indeed, the idea of ‘empty’, ‘reserve’ or ‘marginal’ land is central to the ‘land grab’
scenario set out in the literature, concepts that render areas classiﬁed as ‘public land’
available to appropriation. Typically this scenario is seen to involve the transition of
‘reserve land’ into production, along with the dispossession and the marginalization of
existing landholders (Borras and Franco 2010, 9–10). The term ‘marginal land’ has
various meanings in diﬀerent disciplines (Tang et al. 2010, 113–114). For economists,
land is marginal when the result of cost-beneﬁt analysis is negative. Assessments also
consider land marginal if it has poor quality, is remote, is arid, is infertile or lacks
infrastructure (e.g. roads, electricity). Administrators can classify land as ‘marginal’
according to a number of categories: temporarily unused lands including land usually
7Such transformations have been relatively easy in forest areas. Following Indonesian law on
forestry (41/1999), around 60 percent of the whole country’s land is deﬁned as state forest.
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cultivated, but that is purposely allowed to stay idle for more than one year (FAO
2006); ‘meadows’ used for herding livestock, and a rest category of ‘other dry lands’.
These technocrats’ and administrators’ categories feed into the imaginative projects
that national planners develop for ‘empty land’, providing for the reshaping of both
places and processes (Tsing 2005, 32). In short, the ‘outer islands ﬁt the proﬁle not only
of countries and landscapes which investors prefer to target, but also of locations for
which large-scale land acquisitions will create the greatest risk of negative
environmental and social outcomes’ (Deininger 2011, 224).
Although land schemes in Indonesia often include commitments and promises
regarding poverty alleviation or creation of rural employment, only in some cases is
an actual improvement in smallholder livelihoods observed (McCarthy et al. 2012).
Meanwhile, processes such as logging, large-scale oil palm and timber plantations,
exclusionary conservation zoning, resettlement schemes and the emergence of cash
crop commodity booms continue to signiﬁcantly alter land uses. The impact on
agrarian structures is seen clearly in successive agricultural censuses. Between 1983
and 2003 the Gini coeﬃcient for land distribution in outer island Indonesia increased
from 0.48 to 0.58, indicating rapidly growing inequality in land ownership. In two
‘outer island’ provinces where researchers have carried out longitudinal surveys,
South Sumatra and South Kalimantan, the percentages of households in the
category of ‘marginal farmers’ (petani gurem), with landholdings considered too
small to meet more than subsistence requirements, have increased from 9 percent to
20 percent and from 30 percent to 40 percent in each province respectively over 20
years (Lokollo et al. 2007). It is possible to read these changes as processes of de-
agrarianization, representing a diversiﬁcation of livelihoods that are now less tied to
the land. As Rigg (2006) argues, an agrarian crisis may have been averted through a
shift in livelihoods to non-farm activities, and to economic activities beyond the
village. To be sure, a dynamic class of entrepreneurial smallholders is emerging that,
together with domestic investors, is deriving a lucrative livelihood from boom crops
such as oil palm and cocoa (Hall 2011). As these emergent ‘progressive farmers’ buy
up surrounding areas of land, their prosperity is linked with problems of agrarian
diﬀerentiation and dispossession (Li 2002, McCarthy 2010, Hall 2011). And despite
this new wealth, in areas distant from the markets provided by industrial and urban
centres, opportunities for livelihood diversiﬁcation remain limited. As many may
only adjust through ‘distress diversiﬁcation’ (Rigg 2006, 194), it is clear that very
large numbers of rural poor remain. Indeed, analysts within Indonesia are worried
about the shift in patterns of land ownership (Lokollo et al. 2007). In many remote
agrarian settings outside Java and Bali, it remains less likely that those rendered
marginal to the agrarian transition – or cycle of enclosures – will ﬁnd better
livelihoods on smaller areas of land, in the absence of supporting rural policy, or in
rural markets with a low capacity to absorb labour (Li 2010). Civil society
organizations that could support the marginalized are weak or absent in these areas.
The legal system in Indonesia may intend to protect the land rights of its citizens,
including those who live in areas targeted for land acquisition. However, land rights
are often insecure and contested. For example, state policies and laws that facilitate
the allocation of lands to plantations have tended to be used in new ways to
support national development strategies. Such transformations have been relatively
easy in forest areas. Indonesian Forestry law classiﬁes around 60 percent of the
country’s land as ‘state forest,’ over which the Ministry of Forestry asserts control.
In resource-rich outer islands, this percentage is often even higher; in Central
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Kalimantan it is 82 percent (Aﬁﬀ et al. 2010, 37). The Ministry of Forestry asserts
the legal authority to allocate use of these areas, and to issue licenses to private
companies for forest exploitation. Although Indonesian law does allow for state
recognition of customary land rights, in practice there are many requirements. Most
of all, this needs a strong political intention – an element that has tended to be
missing. Consequently, such recognition is rarely accomplished (Bakker 2009). As a
result, so-called ‘state forests’ include many cultivated ﬁelds and villages. For
example, in the Central Kalimantan case discussed below, the land mapped as ‘state
forest’ contains 187 villages with 350,000 inhabitants.
The process of decentralizing the state, which began in 2001, has complicated this
further by increasing procedural and institutional complexity. This has exacerbated
the lack of integrated institutional arrangements between key actors and agencies,
without providing eﬀective systems and structures to hold state-based actors
accountable. Given the conﬂicts of interest between various state agencies, actors can
utilize the inconsistencies regarding authority within the state legal system for their
own ends, to advance particular interpretations on the status of land, and to contest
particular allocations. Foreign companies wanting to access land face the challenge
of identifying which state institutions to negotiate with to obtain legal permission to
start operations.8 ‘Fuzzy’ land rights, in a context of overlapping tenurial regimes
and unclear, complicated or conﬂicted procedures, mean that investors need to
navigate elaborate networks of permits and recommendations to proceed. Yet, as Ho
(2001) suggests, ambiguity in property relations can serve certain purposes. It allows
communities, corporations and other actors to advance competing agendas and
deﬁnitions, seeking justiﬁcation in diﬀerent areas of law. It also provides state based
actors with maximum discretionary authority, allowing them to allocate develop-
ment rights, to obtain political capital and opportunities for rent seeking. The
downside is the ‘high risk that the deliberate institutional ambiguity becomes an
instrument in the violation of villagers’ interests’ (Ho 2001, 421). Where disputes are
resolved by recourse to power or coercion, land conﬂicts remain extensive.
Decentralization of government authorities to the districts and provincial
governments has exposed the reality that, behind the fac¸ade of policy narratives,
the state functions as a cluster of institutions (Barker and Van Klinken 2009, 40–42).
Politico-bureaucratic actors operate within a clientelist network that encompasses
parties and corporations. In outer island Indonesia, actors thrive or ﬂounder
depending upon their control of rents derived from the resource sector. Following
decentralization, District Heads are directly elected, and regional governments have
a more formal role in the allocation of land use permits. These dynamics make
regional governments responsive to locally powerful actors and interest groups, and
those able to invest in a particular region, arguably dampening the inﬂuence of
national policy agendas. These developments have inﬂuenced the proliferation of
types of actors who are engaged in or beneﬁt from large land schemes.
Taken together, these dynamics make it more diﬃcult to locate a ‘land grabbing’
process that corresponds to a single, coherent or intelligible process of agrarian
transition ‘that assumes a linear pathway, and a predictable set of connections’
8A look at the ‘Investment guide/ permit license mechanism’ on the website of the Indonesia
Investment Coordinating Board (BKKPM) gives an idea about the number of permits and
recommendations required. Available from: http://www4.bkpm.go.id/contents/general/12/
permit-license-mechanism [Accessed 26 March 2012].
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(Li 2010, 69). What initially appears as an archetypal ‘land grab’ may turn out to
exist within a virtual reality of state spatial planning and land development permits,
or may work to a logic that diﬀers from the formal policy intention.
We now turn to considering how the four key arguments are demonstrated
within our four chosen case studies: the key food crop (rice); the key industrial cash
crops (oil palm); biofuels (Jatropha); and ﬁnally forestry (carbon sequestration).
We focus on the degree to which processes of land appropriation associated with
each commodity are leading to dramatic transformations in land uses and property
relations, and the question of who beneﬁts in which way.
Rice and food security
We begin our discussion of the trajectories of land use acquisition and enclosure by
considering the ﬁrst of the four processes: large-scale enclosure processes motivated by
the pursuit of food security or food self-suﬃciency. Historically food self-suﬃciency
represents a long-term concern of Indonesian policy makers and has motivated
national projects to grow rice in outer island areas. Rice, as Indonesia’s main staple
food, plays an important role in state eﬀorts to maintain political stability, with policy
makers reluctant to become overly dependent on ﬂuctuating international markets
(Timmer 1993). A food crisis will create complex political problems (Eifert et al. 2003),
potentially creating massive social unrest that can be mobilized by political actors to
topple a government. As an example, in the 1960s, 600 percent inﬂation and
widespread food shortages contributed to the fall of the Sukarno regime. The next
president, Suharto, responded by prioritizing self-suﬃciency in rice production,
including access to rice for the poor, and stability in rural areas. State policies included
subsidies and market interventions involving BULOG, a state agency that set out to
maintain adequate rice supplies at aﬀordable prices. State revenues from the 1970s oil
boom were used to improve agricultural infrastructure, to supply low-cost agricultural
inputs and stimulate the introduction of high yielding rice varieties.9 The rice self-
suﬃciency policy appealed strongly to nationalist sentiments, and symbolized the
Suharto regime’s success in the mid-1980s. However, by the early 1990s national rice
production could not keep up with increasing consumption.
As a solution, the Suharto government established a one million-ha rice
cultivation project in Central Kalimantan, the ‘mega-rice project’.10 Because the area
consisted of undisturbed peat land, environmental groups argued that the project
would have devastating ecological and social impacts. Suharto’s authoritarian
regime was not responsive to opposition criticism. The project is considered by some
to have displayed much of the hubris of other examples of ‘high modernism’: a clear
attempt to use centralized planning and rational engineering to remake a social and
natural order to achieve a utopia (Scott 1998).
The project is now seen as a failure, due in large part to the unsuitability of the
land for rice cultivation, and the devastating impacts on the environment and the
livelihoods of the thousands of people within the project area. As in many earlier
transmigration schemes in peat swamp areas, technocratic planners failed to learn
the lessons oﬀered by traditional farming techniques regarding choice of plants and
9For an overview of the Government’s policy for increasing rice production see Hill (2000,
125–138).
10The actual size of the project area is approximately 1.4 million ha.
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cultivation methods on marginal soils. Engineering failures left upstream areas
drought-stricken in the dry season, and ﬂooded in the wet. This, together with forest
ﬁres that destroyed rattan gardens, ensured the collapse of the livelihoods of
indigenous people over a wide area. At the same time, pest infestations led to failure
of the agricultural eﬀorts of many Javanese in-migrants, encouraging many to take
up illegal logging or to return home after their period of government support ended
(McCarthy 2012). The mega-rice project was not, however, a failure for all: it
provided economic beneﬁts through logging and the supply of heavy equipment
(Suyanto et al. 2009, ii). In December 1999, after the fall of Suharto, the project was
terminated. It stands as an example of how, even with extensive investment in food
production, and even with the support of a powerful developmental state and major
technological inputs, there is no guarantee of success.
The post-Suharto period saw several shifts in how state planners addressed the
food security issue (Neilson and Ariﬁn 2011). Under a more market-focused polity,
after 2005 the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) government began attempting to
secure ‘food security’ via imports. Indonesia has since become the fourth largest
global rice importer, and this policy has been subject to harsh criticism and has
become a political resource for government critics. In response to such criticism, and
to the apparent challenges of accessing rice in the international market, since then
agricultural policy makers have shifted back to supporting more intensive
agricultural production on underutilized or ‘idle land’ in outer island Indonesia.11
In 2008, the Wall Street Journal reported that a project in Papua province was’
the latest example of a new trend for developing countries to lease farmland to
overseas investors in order to proﬁt from rising global food prices’.12 In the project
in question, the local District Head held the political ambition to develop Merauke
into the center of rice production in eastern Indonesia (Ito et al. 2011, 3). He
regarded food estate development as an opportunity to tap into corporate ﬁnancing
and advance the cause of establishing South Papua Province (Caroko et al. 2011, 15).
In 2006, the national government supported the idea of food estate development,
and designated Merauke as ‘the national food basket’ (Ito et al. 2011, 3), echoing
Dutch colonial policies in 1939 in the same area (Manikmas 2010). Initially the plan
was to establish the Merauke Integrated Rice Estate. In 2009, when newspapers
reported that rice would be exported from Merauke to Saudi Arabia, the project’s
goals were adjusted and framed more explicitly in terms of ‘food security’, suggesting
a throwback to mega-rice project style interventions (Media Indonesia 2011b).
‘Energy security’ became a second goal of the estate development, and in 2010 the
Merauke Integrated Energy and Food Estate was launched. The Indonesian
conglomerate Medco (which was also active in logging) had been oﬀering ﬁnancial
backing and assistance to ﬁnd foreign investors for the project. Medco proposed that
at least a million ha in Merauke should be allocated for production of sugar cane,
sorghum, rice, soybeans and maize, and strongly promoted this view to the president
(Down to Earth 2008). As of 2011, there are also plans to open 2 million ha of new
food estates in Sumatra and Kalimantan (Media Indonesia 2011c). Given the
political importance of rice, however, the national government has faced political
11There are also eﬀorts to improve production in rice producing areas (e.g. improved pest
management), and other policies, including ensuring BULOG stockpiles are suﬃcient to avoid
food shortages.
12Wall Street Journal 11/7/08 cited in Down to Earth (2008).
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diﬃculties in attempting to obtain foreign investment to take control of these vast
areas of land to produce rice for export. The food security issue posited limits to the
‘land grab’, by ensuring that food estates focus on domestic ‘food security’ issues.
Moreover, as with the earlier case, these land acquisitions occur in more ‘peripheral’
areas unsuitable for intensive rice cultivation.
The political sensitivities raised by the project created other obstacles to
implementation of the million ha food estate in Papua. Given the scarcity of
labour in frontier areas, the mega-rice project would bring many migrants into
Papua. Such immigration has often been associated with ethnic tension, given the
diﬀerence in cultural practices between indigenous people and Javanese migrants.
Some Papuans would view the practice of bringing Javanese labour into Papua as
‘internal colonialization’, and the project may well inﬂame separatist grievances.
Taken together, these factors have made large investment in Papua more
complex. In August 2011, the diﬃculties of freeing up the land, together with the
objections of indigenous communities and a new District Head, culminated in,
forcing the Minister of Agriculture to announce that food estates projects would
be moved to East Kalimantan (Jakarta Globe 2011). With large areas now
subject to land development licenses, the Merauke area is open for development,
and rumours have continued to circulate that the area may still be developed for
oil palm.
To sum up, then, contemporary large-scale acquisitions motivated by food
security or food self-suﬃciency agendas are congruent with earlier historical
experiences. However, given the social, political and environmental constraints,
there appears to be an inevitability to the partial realization or failure of many
schemes. As in the other three processes to be discussed below, interactions
between formal and vernacular processes of rural land development proved critical.
Yet, even when acquisitions remained ‘virtual’, as in the one million-ha scheme,
they have allowed actors to pursue interests (e.g. timber extraction) that did not
require successful rice production. Further, the ‘failed’ acquisition process proved
critical in the wholesale transformation of the landscape. In the ex-mega rice area
in Central Kalimantan, the district government has issued plantation permits in an
attempt to attract investors. The district could readily do this because the mega-
rice project had already rezoned this deep peat forest area for agricultural
production. By 2010, 23 oil palm plantation companies had been granted such
licenses (Aﬁﬀ et al. 2010). The next section examines enclosure processes associated
with oil palm.
Oil palm and export earnings
We continue our discussion of trajectories of land use acquisition and enclosure by
considering the development schemes and virtual land acquisitions associated with
oil palm. In the 1980s, Indonesian state planners began to realise the developmental
potential of oil palm. Since then, a developmental narrative has underpinned
practices that have continued to attract investments and loans. As articulated by
state oﬃcials, this narrative focuses on potential land as a lure to capital investment
in a key global boom crop (McCarthy and Cramb 2009). Ever-rising prices in
a global market have sustained an oil palm bubble that underpins this narrative.
While there have been dips in global prices, these have quickly rebounded. After
the 2008 price collapse, for example, prices increased by 15 percent by early 2011
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(Jakarta Post 2011). With global demand increasing, and with good crop yields, the
expansive phase continued. As investors rely on the ﬁnancial reality that oil palm
production will deliver a high rate of return, government decision-makers have
continued to develop exuberant oil palm development plans.13
Previously, under the New Order, various policies provided for smallholder
out-grower schemes, which allowed for more indirect forms of control over
production in smallholder areas. Under these contract schemes, smallholders
would retain legal title and would be integrated into global supply chains through
the contract form. A signiﬁcant body of research demonstrates that, under
favourable conditions, smallholders can obtain income from oil palm that is
signiﬁcantly higher in terms of return-to-labour than other options (Rist et al.
2010). Successfully integrated smallholders have experienced the positive aspects of
insertion into highly productive, intensive agricultural systems. As a corollary of
smallholder schemes – and the emergence of an independent smallholder sector –
the area cultivated by smallholders has grown by 2 million ha since 2000, and in
2009 accounted for approximately half of the total area under oil palm (USDA
2009). However, smallholders who have been left out, or included on less
favourable terms, suﬀer as their agricultural products and rural wages fail to keep
up with food price increases. Many are forced to sell land under livelihood crises
(McCarthy 2010).
At the national level, planners consider very large areas of ‘public land’ to be
available for plantations development. In 2004 the Directorate General of Plantation
Production and Development estimated that 32 million ha were suitable for oil palm
production. Indeed, planners had already rezoned large areas, previously designated
as ‘forest’, for oil palm cultivation. Between 2000 and 2009, authorities allocated
approximately 10 million ha of new land licenses to domestic and international
investors (USDA 2009). The national daily Kompas stated that by 2010, district
governments across the country had issued initial plantation licenses for over
26 million ha (Pontianak Post 2011). The national government had set a target of
15 million ha of oil palm by 2020, although by 2010 oil palm plantations
encompassed 7.56 million ha (USDA 2010). Although actual cultivation is
conducted at a fraction of the scale mentioned in initial plans and reports, the
cultivation, processing and export of oil palm remain very signiﬁcant activities.
Every year, 33 oil palm companies manage to open around 300,000–400,000 new ha
(Teoh 2010, Pontianak Post 2011).
In the context of the oil palm boom, the regional press illustrates the inﬂated,
speculative nature of land acquisitions – or virtual land grabs – associated with this
booming sector. During 2009–2010, West Kalimantan newspapers reported
government estimates that up to six million ha of ‘potential land’ and ‘critical land’
in the province could be made available for oil palm. However, reports also noted
plantation developers’ lack of capacity to make use of this land: by late 2010, only
35 percent of the 1.5 million ha that the provincial government had zoned for oil
palm had already been planted (Kapuas Post 2009). Government statistics revealed
that companies were only planting 20,000 ha per year. Development permits became
13To date the expansion does not seem to be driven by biofuel markets – although many
investments were put into biofuels just prior to 2008, the rapid decline in the oil price put the
biofuel issue on ice for some time.
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objects of investment by speculators with little immediate prospect of plantation
development over much of the land subject to development licenses.
Private and state companies had accumulated ‘land banks’ – land under
various licenses that are currently inactive but are set aside for later development
– estimated to extend to 6.5–7 million ha by 2008 (USDA 2010). Outside
Sumatra, oil palm processing and transportation infrastructure has remained less
developed. Consequently, licenses are much more valuable close to the
infrastructure required for plantation development.14 Unused plantation licenses
tend to work as ‘development options’ – or amount to ‘a monopoly right to buy
or use’ – that allows for the possibility of either developing a plantation or selling
on the opportunity. For entrepreneurs without the capital to actually invest in
growing oil palm, initial investments for obtaining licenses tend to pay oﬀ because
if the holder of the plantation permit is unable to proceed to the plantation stage,
they can later trade the permit in a rising market and hence obtain a return on
their initial investments. As new investors need to negotiate with those holding
these relatively scarce ‘development options’, the investment is potentially very
lucrative. This is particularly the case given the failure of state authorities to make
use of provisions allowing for the cancellation of non-performing plantation
concessions.
Large-scale foreign investment involving direct control over large areas of land
plays a key role in most ‘land grab’ scenarios. Indeed, foreign investment remains
signiﬁcant, especially from other developing country sources. It was reported in 2011
that foreign investors own 25 percent of around two million ha of oil palm
plantation area in Riau. Malaysian investors have also been carrying out intense
plantation expansions in West Kalimantan, buying up around 50 percent of oil palm
plantations in this province (Jakarta Post 2011).
Domestic and transnational players often play complementary roles (cf. Borras
and Franco 2010). Rather than leaving themselves open to the accusation of
engaging in ‘land grabs’ by taking up direct ownership of land under poor
governance arrangements, foreign investors can be ‘silent partners’ of local ﬁrms in
food and agro-fuel projects. To give just one example, in May 2008 it was reported
that Bakrie Sumatera, a branch of the Bakrie conglomerate, was investing USD
260 million to double its plantation holdings, raising USD 80 million from an
international equities consortium (Jakarta Post 2008).
However, integration into global production networks does not necessarily
require direct control over production by investors. Large-scale palm oil buyers
(e.g. Unilever) may sit at the downstream end, purchasing the undiﬀerentiated
product in bulk through globalized value chains. As buyers in decentralized global
production networks, they can avoid some of the opprobrium associated with
problems in the upstream sector where production takes place, reducing any negative
impacts on their brand names through discontinuing purchases from problem
companies and supporting certiﬁcation schemes that provide for codes of conduct
regarding land acquisition policies.
Clearly, oil palm expansion is inserted into a particular local political-
economic context that shapes outcomes. Following decentralization reforms,
district oﬃcials hold key powers within networks involving local businessmen,
14This is a reason for local land owners’ and license holders’ lobby at district government to
spend their budgets on infrastructure development.
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brokers, investors, local companies, local populations and large corporations. For
district governments a failure to attract investors would be perceived as an
inability to deliver the maximum development beneﬁts. On the other hand, local
governments who attract investors and issue large numbers of permits gain
directly – from entitlements in oil palm schemes and through support for electoral
programs in return for services rendered. Oil palm, in the words of one observer,
has emerged as an ‘elite business between investors and rogue oﬃcials (oknum) in
the regional elite who possess control of the land’ (Supriyanto, 2007). The low
realization of land development compared with the total number of permits issued
indicates the intensity of the practice of ‘land division’ and brokering of land
permits by rogue regional oﬃcials (Pontianak Post 2009). In the absence of
eﬀective forms of accountability, too often customary and community leaders are
involved in ‘freeing up’ land, in land sales manipulated by village heads and
brokers.
The terms under which smallholders engage with oil palm have changed
remarkably over the last decade. Government policies have consistently sought to
liberalize investment requirements, for instance seeking to increase the length of
agricultural concessions from 25 to 95 years, and allowing direct foreign
investment in the sector.15 A new ‘partnership’ (kemitraan) policy privileged
private sector partnerships with smallholders. Under this model, beneﬁt and land
sharing arrangements are to be negotiated directly with landowners in the ﬁeld.
Rather than providing 70 percent of an oil palm development to smallholders as
under previous schemes, the core or ‘nucleus’ estate is only obliged to return 20
percent of the scheme land to villagers, retaining up to 80 percent of the land as
its plantation estate. This amounts to a shift towards decentralized-localized
community based negotiations that are easily manipulated. Large-scale violations
continue despite codes of conduct and legal innovations that provide for elements
of ‘free, prior and informed consent’. This is because too often the local actors –
including community leaders and state oﬃcials – who play a mediating role in
such processes have an underlying interest in ensuring that land acquisitions go
ahead.16 As land- and beneﬁt-sharing arrangements deteriorated under the new
schemes, some might argue that this amounts to a type of reverse land reform or
land grab. If plantation development that includes smallholders will only occur
in accordance with policy that provides up to 80 percent of the development area
to estates, this will exacerbate the increasingly salient problem of ‘marginal
farmers’ who have landholdings deemed to be too small to meet subsistence
requirements.
When the ‘sweet promises’ made by companies in the process of ‘freeing up’ land
are not realized, large numbers of conﬂicts emerge. Too often farmers lose out at the
point that customary or uncertiﬁed property rights are converted into state-
recognized land tenure for concession licenses under district supervision. This is
because land negotiations are left to local land owners and investors, leaving
outcomes susceptible to the diﬀerences in power and knowledge between these two
15The 95-year lease provision of the 2007 Foreign Investment law was thrown out by the
Constitutional Court as unconstitutional and in contravention of the Basic Agrarian Law in
2008.
16See Borras and Franco (2010), and for an analysis relevant to oil palm see McCarthy et al.
(2012).
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parties. There are conﬂicts over land purchases and compensation processes deemed
to be unjust, over the perceptions that plantations have failed to return smallholder
‘plasma’ entitlements, over the lack of extension and development assistance to
smallholders, and over proﬁt-sharing arrangements from ‘fresh fruit bunches’ at the
farmer level that are deemed unjust (Borneo Tribune 2010; Colchester et al. 2006).
NGOs claim that the level of conﬂict is growing during the era of decentralized-
localized community based negotiations.17
In conclusion, the oil palm-related processes follow a characteristic pattern of
fragmented, diﬀerentiated, and decentralized land acquisitions involving various
coalitions of actors that parallels the other cases. Oil palm has emerged as the
priority crop for many actors, particularly as it oﬀers lucrative opportunities, not
only from selling the oil. Despite the potent forces pushing real, large-scale
transformations, we still ﬁnd a signiﬁcant gap between projects, plans and booster
rhetoric and actual practices on the ground. In parallel with the pattern found in the
other processes discussed in this paper, the oil palm boom also corresponds with
an extraordinary number of ‘virtual acquisitions’ – speculatory activity involving the
pocketing of permits. Critics have subjected palm oil palm expansion to strong
criticism, particularly for its environmental impacts.18 Yet, in comparison with the
other processes examined in this paper, oil palm has potentially the most signiﬁcant
implications for the livelihoods of local smallholders and agricultural labourers.
Policy choices prefer large-scale, capital-intensive investments over more small-
holder-focused initiatives that might provide for greater smallholder inclusion. In
addition to oil palm, companies and governments do consider the potential of
alternative crops more suited to ‘marginal areas’, and the next case discusses land
acquisitions associated with one such crop.
Jatropha and green biofuels
We now turn to our third enclosure and land acquisition process: that associated
with Jatropha. From 2003 onwards, a new set of large-scale land acquisitions
focused on areas that planners had considered ‘marginal’ and thus economically
uninteresting. These areas had yet to experience such large land projects. Yet, seen
from a national perspective, this is a continuation of earlier policies to turn nature
in the outer islands into economic resources. Rising world crude oil prices and
attention to climate change inspired the Indonesian government’s policy for biofuel
production in 2006. This biofuel policy aimed at turning ‘marginal’ or ‘degraded’
areas into biofuel production zones. Interventions would need to develop areas
with unsuited ecologies or otherwise poor infrastructure. Foreign investments in
biofuel plantations would yield renewable energy, create employment and
contribute to poverty alleviation. For example, projects could cultivate Jatropha,
a crop deemed suited to ‘marginal’ dry land, in arid areas of the province Nusa
Tenggara Timur (NTT). Unlike in Kalimantan or Papua, spatial planning
processes mapped only a quarter of the land surface in this province as forest,
and classiﬁed around 40 percent as unused or very extensively used land. In 2007
17According to one report, there were 660 conﬂicts in 2010 compared to 116 conﬂicts in 2009
(Pontianak Post 2011).
18For example, see the Greenpeace Kit-Kat TV commercial (Greenpeace 2010).
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provincial and national newspapers reported the ﬁrst initiatives for large
plantations in this province, which is one of the poorest areas of Indonesia.19
In the early 2000s, boosters claimed that Jatropha curcas was the ideal crop for
producing energy from such marginal land without large inputs. Jongschaap et al.
(2007, 5) listed 11 popular claims about the crop in 2007, including that the crop
reclaims marginal soils, is drought tolerant, has low nutrient requirements, provides
high oil yields, and requires low labour inputs. However, those advancing these
claims failed to utilize scientiﬁcally sound information.
Based on this advocacy, in 2007 the national daily Kompas announced
international Jatropha investments in the Central Sumba district, on the island of
Sumba in NTT. The new investments encompassed an area between 10,000 and
20,000 ha, and up to 100,000 ha in East Sumba (Biopact 2007). The provincial
government website indicated that a total of 2,177,456 ha would be available for
Jatropha cultivation in the whole province (NTT Government 2009). The sheer size
of these ﬁgures indicates the possibility of virtual land acquisitions. Checking
against government statistics regarding ‘empty land’, it is apparent that in 2008,
42 percent of NTT remained unused (BPS-NTT 2010). This suggests there is ample
land for agricultural enterprises in these districts. Given this, the question remains
why these lands remained uncultivated. To realize plans for 20,000 ha of plantations
in Central Sumba, developers would need to increase plantation areas by
400 percent, encompassing about a quarter of all the ‘empty land’. As the land
has poor infrastructure (or none at all), is undulating, has little water (no irrigation),
and poor soil fertility, planners might consider it as ‘marginal’ to productive
agriculture (GFA 2008). Additionally, these districts of NTT are sparsely
populated. Consequently, very little labour is available locally. Large-scale
plantations would also require well-managed logistics and marketing (Strydom
2006), a challenge in this remote frontier. The reality that these circumstances do
not favour successful plantations further supports the suspicion that this might be a
case of virtual land grabbing. However, if cultivation is not the real purpose, what
could make such plans proﬁtable?
The ﬁrst answer in the case of Jatropha plans is subsidies. During the period
2005–2008, in Indonesia and many other countries (Ariza-Montobbio et al. 2010,
Hunsberger 2010), government policy and legislation were interlinked with
budgets and international subsidy ﬂows driving Jatropha activities. The district
Agricultural Service in West Sumba implemented a Jatropha introduction
program, distributing seeds and inputs. Village agricultural extension workers
explained cultivation methods for commercial purposes to farmers. The state
owned enterprise PT Rajawali Nusantara Indonesia (PT RNI) implemented a
demonstration plot close to the capital Waingapu in 2006–2007. PT RNI
commissioned local producers in Sumba – including a member of the East Sumba
District Parliament – to produce many thousands of Jatropha seedlings, a large
percentage of which were never planted or died in the nursery (Vel 2008, Vel and
Makambombu 2010). Actual cultivation and post-harvest activities, including
trade, processing and transport, were apparently not included in the Ministry of
Agriculture’s projects.
19In 2009 National Statistics listed NTT as 31st out of 33 in its ranking of provinces according
to their Human Development Index (BPS 2010).
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Subsequent research revealed that large-scale land acquisitions for Jatropha had
yet to eventuate. Apparently the actors involved in this Jatropha program never
intended to grow Jatropha and produce biodiesel: they just harvested subsidies. The
state had provided many Jatropha-related subsidies (Dillon et al. 2008, 36–43). These
included interest rate subsidies, agribusiness development programs, infrastructure
subsidies, tax reductions for biofuel-related investments, training programme
support, and research and development budgets. Consequently, many Jatropha-
related activities involved linking state agencies with each other in a subsidy chain.
Seen from this perspective, newspaper reports regarding 100,000 ha of land
acquisitions underpinned a discourse that supported budget grabbing among
domestic actors and agencies.
The links between land acquisition plans, land permits and bank loans provide
a second rationale for virtual land grabbing. This feature is not conﬁned to
Jatropha projects: it is part of a pattern of ‘failing plantations’ in Sumba. The
website of the NTT Government (2009) provided two reasons for failing
plantations. First, the rural population had traumatic past experiences with estate
development in NTT. These projects had failed to bring economic beneﬁts to
farmers. Second, farmers wish to avoid investing in cultivating estate or cash crops
that lack a stable market price. Indeed, in interviews, farmers in Central Sumba
explained that they had planted many Jatropha trees in 2006 after hearing positive
news regarding the plant’s potential. Later they stopped cultivating when they
found out there were no marketing channels or processing facilities. However, the
reasons for non-implementation of announced large Jatropha schemes, or failing
plantations, lie elsewhere. Other actors – entrepreneurs, state oﬃcials, and brokers
– have used the plans for purposes other than cultivating crops. While they may
have succeeded, ‘plantation failure’ has happened so often that we can see a
pattern.20
Sumba’s wealth of ‘empty lands’ attracted many potential investors in
agricultural projects. As in Central Kalimantan and Merauke, district governments
in Sumba encouraged commercial agricultural development for district economic
growth, rural employment, and district governments’ tax income. Plantation
initiatives over the decade to 2011 focused on Jatropha curcas, maize, cotton,
sugarcane, cashew or sorghum. Field visits to the area where the plantations were
planned revealed few operational activities. Interviews with the local population,
NGOs and the district government services indicated the following pattern of
experiences with plantation development in Sumba. First, a high government oﬃcial
introduces an idea for a new cash crop. There is a promising initial phase, and an
Indonesian company responds by discussing potential plantation sites with the
district oﬃcials. An international company or foundation gets involved as the
investor (lender). Websites promote the idea and describe large-scale, long-term
projects, creating high expectations. An oﬃcial ceremony occurs, where companies
and the district government sign a ‘letter of intent’ or ‘a memorandum of
understanding’. The local newspaper covers this signing ceremony and reports are
posted on the internet.
20Since 2006 JacquelineVel has been observing the developments in large-scale commercial
agriculture in Sumba, one of Indonesia’s outer islands (Vel 2008, Vel and Makambombu
2010).
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Second, a phase of limited implementation follows. The district government
issues a location permit for a much smaller area than the initial plans stated. This
allows the company to start exploratory activities, and obliges the company to
negotiate with local land owners about the terms for land use/acquisition, and to
conduct an environmental assessment. The company sets up some minor activities:
building one road, and one small warehouse; getting some equipment and making
a fence and a sign board. Then the company tries to persuade local famers to
collaborate with the plantation, particularly when this is a requirement for obtaining
a bank loan. The plantation company employs a few local people as ‘permanent
staﬀ’ and casual labourers to do seasonal work or to construct fences. Part of the
land is cultivated with the crop for one or two seasons.
Third, we see the phase of acknowledging failure. Typically, after several years,
activities end. Local informants describe instances where the company’s manage-
ment stated that the area was unsuitable after all, that the local population was
uncooperative (and sometimes even burnt the plantation), or that the company was
in ﬁnancial trouble. There are always rumors about bankruptcy and plantation loans
being used for other purposes. Finally the company disappears from the district
scene.
Plantation failure does not reﬂect the willingness or capacity of farmers to
develop cash crops. Farmers widely cultivate crops that have proven to be proﬁtable.
For example, cashews and candlenuts ﬂourish as cash crops. At ﬁrst, government
and NGOs promoted these crops, but since 2009 smallholders have been producing
most of the volume. With steady demand and prices, and a well-developed
marketing channel, both crops have proved suited to the agronomic conditions of
Sumba.
For biofuel crops, however, after the initial activities of promoting plans,
exploring sites and applying for budgets, grants and subsidies, in many cases
agricultural investments fail to materialize. Despite this, government oﬃcials
welcome these land deals – even lobbying aggressively to ensure they occur
(Kugelman 2009, 3). The deals may represent virtual land grabbing. In October
2011, we heard the pejorative term now used to refer to companies that specialize in
virtual land grabbing: the label ‘PT Akan’, literally translated as ‘Will Do Ltd’, hints
at the agenda behind the promise of future realization.
Consequently, the jatropha case clearly ﬁts the wider pattern presented in this
paper. Actual processes on the ground diﬀer remarkably from the situation intimated
by the land development narratives of project boosters. The jatropha phenomenon
would seem to accord with the boom and bust cycle – high global prices and good
prospects lead to an inﬂow of investment that is never realized. However, as
developmental scenarios are consistently not achieved, another agenda becomes
apparent: the use of permits to capture linked budgets and subsidies as well as the rents
associated with investments. Thus, jatropha processes ﬁt into our wider argument: as
developmental narratives take up new global concerns, they continue to legitimize
large-scale land acquisitions, leaving a heritage of failed large land schemes – in this
case, as they remain spectral, there are limited impacts on the ground.
While foreign capital in part drives land acquisition for Jatropha plantations, the
subsidies and bank loans are mostly from domestic sources. In the next section the
role of international actors and capital is more apparent. Initiatives for reducing
carbon emissions from deforestation in developing countries have necessitated
a similar pattern of allocating large areas of land for green agendas.
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Forests and carbon trading
Finally, we now consider the fourth of our large enclosure processes: green
acquisitions associated with carbon sequestration. The global initiative aimed at
Reducing the Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, known as
‘REDD,’ amounts to another type of large-scale land allocation involving the
injection of large capital investments into remote forest frontiers. The REDD scheme
depends upon ﬁnancial transfers from donor governments in highly industrialized
countries to actors in developing countries where greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
from forest conversions are considerable. Among tropical countries, Indonesia ranks
ﬁrst and Brazil second as net GHG emitters, together contributing approximately
50 percent of global GHG emissions (Verchot and Petkova 2009). Under the initial
proposal set out in the 13thConference of Parties under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change in Bali in 2007, Indonesia would receive
ﬁnancial assistance to prevent further exploitation and degradation of its forests
(PEACE 2007). Although the idea behind REDD is simple, the ‘mechanism’ is rather
complicated. Local actors in a forest in Indonesia will only receive compensation
payments for their REDD activities following a long and successful process of
planning, calculation and negotiation. Any REDD project proposal requires
approvals for the activities implemented. Further, it needs to document the size of
the emission reduction, obtain a speciﬁed type of ﬁnancing, and indicate how the
beneﬁts will be distributed (Parker et al. 2009, 18). This requires a variety of expertise
and involves a multitude of actors. The scope of REDD has expanded to include
carbon sequestration from conservation, sustainable management of forests, and
enhancement of forest carbon stocks, now known as REDDþ.
As in the cases discussed in the previous sections, there are huge claims regarding
the areas that will be allocated for REDDþ projects. Donors and implementing
agencies are engaged in a rush to develop REDDþ projects, and although the
precise number remains unclear, one report claimed that more than 60 REDDþ
Demonstration Activities are currently being proposed by bilateral donors, NGOs,
and private companies (World Bank 2011). For instance, in Central Kalimantan, ﬁve
REDDþ projects are listed, encompassing 306,940 ha, and a number of private
companies have submitted proposals for another 615,400 ha (Satuan Tugas REDDþ
2011). At least three of these projects are located in the former one million-ha rice
project area discussed earlier.
The economic interests at stake are large. Donor commitment to Indonesia
signiﬁcantly increased after the G20 meeting in Pittsburg in 2009. Here President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono announced the Government’s commitment to reducing
Indonesia’s GHG emissions by 26 percent by 2020. Estimates of the size of donor
countries’ support for REDDþ schemes in Indonesia vary from USD 62 million
(Satuan Tugas REDDþ 2011, 11) to USD 4.4 billion over the several years from
2011 (Brown and Peskett 2011, 12). The Norwegian government pledged USD 1
billion provided that Indonesia succeeds in reducing its emissions. As a ﬁrst gesture,
the Indonesian government issued a two-year forest moratorium in 2011 to freeze
issuance of new forest exploitation permits to exploit natural primary forests and
peat land.21
21This was agreed in a Letter of Intent between the Government of Indonesia and the
Norwegian government.
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Four years after the Bali Conference, the institutional framework for
implementing REDDþ has yet to be established. It remains unclear which
institution has the authority to prioritize a location, choose the type of REDDþ
scheme to implement, and determine the requirements to be met before a proposal
for a REDDþ project will gain government approval. As a consequence, it remains
unclear how international funds will be spent. A variety of actors have emerged, each
advancing their own REDDþ agendas. Foresters argue that in comparison to other
land categories, peat areas store signiﬁcant amounts of carbon. Indeed, degradation
of Indonesian peat lands, and ﬁre – for example caused by the mega-rice project
discussed above – have caused major carbon emissions. Given that Indonesia has
approximately half of the world’s tropical peat lands (around 21 million ha), donors
have focused on supporting REDDþ projects in outer island regions with large peat-
land ecosystems (DNPI 2011, 6).
Apart from environmental concerns, REDDþ also creates opportunities for
forwarding other agendas. As in the case of Jatropha promotion, global discourses
articulate with domestic dynamics and produce unexpected and oﬃcially unintended
outcomes. To clarify this argument we focus on three types of actors: divisions of the
Ministry of Forestry, plantation companies, and regional governments.
According to state law, the Ministry of Forestry has authority over nearly all
forest land on which REDDþ activities will be applied. REDDþ provides a
validation for further conservation-justiﬁed enclosures in the forestry estate, and for
reasserting forestry department control over this vast area. By revaluing the carbon
located in remote forests as a commodity, this also provides a rationale for land uses
that compete with oil palm, timber plantation and mining enclosures.
The balance of power between diﬀerent actors creates uncertainties. The Ministry
of Forestry is organized in several divisions which compete to promote diﬀerent
types of forest activity. Powerful actors within the Ministry choose between policy
options. Meanwhile agricultural and timber interests continue to inﬂuence decisions
over forest land allocations. In 2010 the Minister of Forestry issued many mining
concessions, while applications for community forestry land piled up. Oil palm
plantation companies also lobby decision-makers strongly, in ways that risk
corrupting the forest land allocation process. The oil palm businesses association
advocates that oil palm should also be eligible for a carbon credit (Creagh 2010).
Meanwhile regional (provincial and district) governments ﬁnd REDDþ a useful tool
for underscoring their autonomy and claiming rights to make decisions regarding
forest use. REDDþ connects these regional governments to international actors
eager to bypass levels of bureaucracy. However, regional governments also weigh
the beneﬁts of REDDþ projects against the opportunity costs of allocating the land
for other economic purposes. Where REDDþ options of combining REDD with
oil palm plantations oﬀer new revenue streams, this is very attractive to regional
governments.
Competition, and overlapping responsibilities and roles between diﬀerent state
actors, contribute to poor policy coordination and contested property relations.
These aﬀect pilot projects, even after oﬃcial project approval. For instance, in the
case of PT. Rimba Raya Conservation, in 2009 the Ministry of Forestry issued a
letter allowing the establishment of a carbon credit scheme, under a speciﬁc license,
over approximately 90,000 ha of state forest.22 However, the regional government
22The license concerned an ecosystem restoration scheme (BPPHP Wilayah XII, 2010).
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had already issued a license to a private oil palm company over part of that same
area. The regional government could have revoked the license, because the oil palm
company had not yet commenced plantation activity, which is a legal basis for
rescinding non-performing projects that leave land idle and unproductive. Moreover,
the area is deep peat land that, according to law, should not be allocated to oil palm
development. Instead of revoking the license, however, in 2011 the Ministry of
Forestry chose to support the oil palm investment, subsequently reducing the carbon
sequestration scheme to 40,000 ha of the forest land area (Fogarty 2011).
The REDDþ issue plays into longstanding conﬂicts over the system for
allocating forest entitlements. REDDþ frameworks are widely seen as favouring
those with formalised property rights (Vatn and Angelsen 2009, 68). If implemented
in ways that enable landowners to obtain formal property rights within the ‘forest
area’, some argue that REDDþ may provide customary land owners with a means
to maintain a foothold on their land vis-a`-vis other policies and developments that
threaten to displace them (Osborne 2011). But there is a risk that ‘the formalisation
of property rights may exclude the rural poor not only from access to REDDþ
resources, but also from land in general’ (Vatn and Angelsen 2009, 68). Further,
carbon forestry restricts land uses in areas zoned for carbon sequestration. Villager
participation in carbon markets may work to constrain access to important beneﬁts
that landowners may have enjoyed up until now (Osborne 2011). However, REDDþ
also creates space for civil society and community actors to advocate recognizing
indigenous rights in areas mapped within the forestry estate. The emerging coalition
of foreign REDDþ actors – including the Norwegian government – and local
people’s representatives together with NGOs, is attempting to use REDDþ as a
means to support the interests of local populations, including access to land and fair
compensation for land uses.
In summary, we can say that up to 2011, the land acquisition ﬁgures mentioned
in reports on REDDþ in Indonesia represent only the start of a long negotiation
process. They do not yet correspond with real ‘green appropriations’. In parallel with
the other cases, REDDþ land claims remain ‘virtual’, until it becomes clear who
decides on land allocations, exactly which activities will obtain REDDþ funding,
and how beneﬁt-sharing arrangements will work. Once again, in large part the
dynamic interaction between formal and vernacular processes will ultimately
determine the extent to which legalized green acquisitions lead to enduring land
use changes.
Discussion
The combined energy, climate and food crises require new remedies and provide new
opportunities. As the solutions to climate-food and energy crises are relocated to
frontier areas, they imply a new ‘spatial ﬁx’ that entails geographical expansion and
restructuring of developmental agendas (Harvey 2001, 24). Elaborate new macro-
economic and agribusiness agendas involve providing millions of hectares of
agricultural and forest land for acquisition or enclosure, to make the most of these
opportunities. New developmental discourses regarding green biofuels, carbon
sequestration or food security provide the foundation for new land acquisitions
where particular actors can connect to real places, promoting new land schemes.
Despite the apparent novelty, however, the new acquisitions following these changes
represent continuity with, rather than a clear break from, earlier patterns of land
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use change. Policy shifts have always corresponded with changes in technologies,
market opportunities and state capacities in recognizable ways. Enduring policy
rationalities continue to be applied to ‘frontier’ spaces. Planners conceive of ‘outer
island’ places as spaces for the elaboration of ambitious national projects to remould
both places and ‘indigenous’ land uses in desired ways (McCarthy and Cramb 2009),
typically in response to newly identiﬁed problems and solutions, and technological
preferences. The pursuit of these agendas depends upon control of land. Indeed, as in
the colonial period, state legal formulations that prioritise property relations
considered ‘legal’ and ‘modern’ over ‘customary’ and ‘indigenous’ relations remain
the key to land acquisition. Yet vernacular processes are decisive for land tenure
in ‘outer island Indonesia’. Receiving formal development licenses from a state
authority is actually just a step in the process of land acquisition. Subsequently,
obtaining property rights in the ﬁeld requires accommodating, compensating,
co-opting or suppressing landowner claims though various local negotiation
processes. This gap also corresponds to a ﬁssure between normative developmental
discourses describing what ought to be done, and how actual processes work out on
the ground and determine who beneﬁts.
As we have seen, only a fraction of land acquisitions lead to on-the-ground
projects. While the reasons for the postponement or ‘failure’ of so many projects
remain largely unexamined, we ﬁnd a clear logic underlying these phenomena.
In many cases, ‘failed’ projects may have been successful in other ways: ‘virtual
acquisitions’ provide opportunities to appropriate subsidies, to obtain bank loans
using land permits as collateral, or to speculate on future increases in land values.
Land mapping processes and concession licenses are never entirely ‘dead letters’:
they provide the raw material for the next stage of land acquisitions. Too often
‘failed’ schemes can ‘succeed’ as they become the basis for the next set of schemes in
the ongoing transformation of landscapes. Although the mega-rice project in Central
Kalimantan failed to provide national (rice) food security, it paved the way for
competing agendas – green acquisitions and oil palm projects.
Green biofuel and carbon sequestration discourses, and food security policy
narratives, compete with high commodity prices generated in international vegetable
oil markets to inﬂate the ‘bubbles’ that drive these land acquisition processes. In
some cases, a setback proves temporary: as the ‘bubble’ fails to burst, it provokes
further investment in land acquisitions. In other cases, falls in commodity markets
and poor realization in the ﬁeld appear to deﬂate the ‘bubble’ until a new chorus of
‘spruikers’ emerges.23 The fact that these rival investment agendas may compete in
the same landscape only works to speed up the process. As a new opportunity for
investment emerges, demand for particular types of land rises. As the bubble inﬂates,
actors chase particular sorts of land development licenses, including actors who lack
the capital to implement a project. Once land development licenses become an object
of investment, any new actor proposing to invest needs to buy out the existing
licence. In such cases, it is easy to misread the large numbers of licenses and project
schemes: virtual becomes real.
In comparing the dynamics shaping the diﬀerent enclosure processes examined
here, we ﬁnd it important to distinguish between diﬀerences in timing, scale, mode of
23A spruiker is ‘someone who toots their own horn’, a tout, or ‘a person standing outside a
place of business trying to persuade patrons to enter, or vigorously trying to persuade
customers to purchase their wares’ (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/spruiker).
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transformation and outcome, as they relate to the characteristics of each commodity.
In the ﬁrst case considered here, the one million-ha mega-rice project in Central
Kalimantan, President Suharto pushed a scheme to achieve national rice self-
suﬃciency, applying all the capacities available to the developmental state. However,
the plan made little ecological sense. Weak and failing implementation – together
with other rent-seeking agendas – left a wide space between intentions and plans and
ﬁeld realities. Over a decade later, after the demise of Indonesia’s developmental
state, a similar food estate plan took shape in Papua. In accord with policy settings
that now privilege decentralization and public-private partnerships, the regional
government and the private sector drove the project. In the planned Merauke food
estate case, the politically charged food security issue limited the prospects for a large
scheme for rice production. Any new food estate plans needed to be framed in terms
of domestic ‘food security’ issues, as projects legitimized to secure the domestic food
supply rather than food for export. Land tenure conﬂicts in Papua and national
political resistance forced the plan to be abandoned.
Oil palm development is also associated with large-scale speculatory land
acquisitions. Oil palm cultivation is very real and proﬁtable, and large-scale land use
changes often ensue. With global demand booming, state planners announced
ambitious developmental targets. As the bubble has inﬂated, entrepreneurs have
chased land development licenses, including many who lack the capital to implement
a project. Virtual land acquisitions associated with oil palm are now very extensive:
by 2010, 26 million ha of oil palm plantation licenses had been issued, despite a
capacity only to plant around 500,000 ha of oil palm each year.
In the case of jatropha, land permits work as a means to access subsidies. ‘Green’,
environmental and poverty alleviation arguments in international discourse lent
support to agendas tied to this crop between 2003 and 2009. The Indonesian
government promoted Jatropha cultivation, and allocated a considerable budget for
research and implementation by the agricultural service. Despite poor results in the
ﬁeld, optimistic information about the crop’s potential, combined with its superﬁcial
yet well-marketed ‘green’ image, continues to create new international investment
ﬂows. Virtual land grabbing in the case of jatropha often amounts to ‘budget
grabbing’: successfully appropriating government budgets and subsidies. It requires
a continuous ﬂow of supporting information on corresponding land acquisitions.
In fact, land permits are collateral for bank loans, even before there is any activity
in the ﬁeld. Then, whenever a plantation company allocates the loan for other
purposes, and fails to implement its proposed agribusiness activities, the land
acquisition remains virtual.
In the years to 2012, the REDDþ boom has been driven by signiﬁcant donor
funds and subsidies. As policy frameworks, the shape of future carbon markets, and
tenurial issues remain unresolved, these pilot projects remain virtual (forest) land
acquisitions rather than restored or conserved forests. Given the competing demand
for land for agricultural expansion, it remains unclear how REDDþ projects alone
will halt the expansion of oil palm or avoid displacing plantation development into
forests outside REDDþ project areas (Poﬀenberger and Smith-Hanssen 2009, 2).
Conclusion
In comparing across the four processes of land acquisition and enclosure, we
ﬁnd that current changes continue well-established historical trajectories of
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land transformation. As we have repeatedly seen, there is a clear logic underlying the
pattern of partial realization or ‘failure’ of many large-scale schemes. Further, we
stress the importance of interactions between formal and vernacular processes in
determining the outcomes of rural land development. Finally, we argue that many
apparent cases of ‘land grabs’ are better understood as virtual land acquisitions.
With respect to the second of these four arguments, we see dynamics working
against large-scale land acquisitions that oﬀer interesting contrasts with the forces
Polyanyi found as acting to slow down or even reverse the extension of market
relations. In his classic discussion, Polanyi (1944) described the emergence of
protective counter-movements that materialize as social actors respond to the
deleterious impact of market relations. In the Indonesian case, we have yet to see
eﬀective counter-moves to protect local sources of livelihood and to de-commodify
land. In many oil palm cases, rather than cessation of commercial smallholder
farming per se, smallholders tend to focus on demanding more eﬀective inclusion in
the new market opportunities. Nonetheless, developmental scenarios often continue
to be problematised, resisted and only partially realised as schemes confront the
diﬃculty of vernacular land tenure processes that lead to diﬃcult land negotiations
and extensive land conﬂicts. Ecologies and commodity price ﬂuctuations impede
large-scale plans – whether they be buying up large areas for corporate agriculture
for food production or enclosing huge areas for other schemes. These, together with
the inchoate reactions of various actors cumulatively – albeit partially – slow land
acquisition processes.
Along with other researchers, we ﬁnd that in the majority of cases domestic
investors are more important than foreign ones (Deininger 2011, 218). Developments
tend to occur within decentralized networks that involve national companies along
with domestic and international investors in transformative processes. This is
because access to land involves complex land transactions with farmers, state
oﬃcials, brokers and agro-industrial enterprises working at various scales. And even
in the case of REDDþ schemes that more clearly involve international actors, still
domestic actors with their own agendas will determine the success of implementation
and the distribution of beneﬁts. The strength of actors in the global production
networks of crops (such as those considered here) requires knowledge and
information. Especially in the case of REDDþ the procedures and processes for
accessing subsidies are very complicated, increasing the power of legal experts and
brokers. Finally, the ultimate question concerns the impact of large-scale land
acquisitions – including virtual ones – on the livelihoods of local smallholders and
agricultural labourers. Policies and schemes – whether they are realized or not –
demonstrate a bias towards development models that are large-scale and involve
signiﬁcant capital investments, rather than privileging labour-intensive initiatives
that support smallholder inclusion (Cotula and Vermeulen 2010). This involves the
alienation of large areas of land. As several analysts have argued, access to land ‘is
strongly related to poverty and inequality’ (Borras et al. 2007, 1). While livelihoods
are becoming less tied to the land across Indonesia, this trend is less pronounced in
outer island Indonesia (Lokollo et al. 2007). In the absence of eﬀective safety nets,
ﬁnding better livelihoods on smaller areas of land is diﬃcult. Further, the pursuit of
improved livelihood occurs in the absence of supporting rural policy, and in rural
markets with a low capacity to absorb labour. In the meantime, land can serve as
a primary source of social security for the rural poor, providing a basic means
of livelihood, making food more available, and providing a buﬀer against
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external shocks. Indeed, Indonesian research has found that ‘there is a strong
correlation between agricultural land ownership and the magnitude of poverty’: ‘the
less land owned the higher the incidence and degree of poverty’ (Rusastra et al. 2008,
30). From this perspective, large-scale land acquisition patterns are associated with
‘disruptive shifts in land rights and increased land concentration’ (UN 2010, 5),
a trajectory that does not favour the poor. Even if acquisitions are virtual, there are
opportunity costs: if there is little activity in the ﬁeld, local people may neither work
for the plantation company nor obtain secure access to the land concerned.
Advocates for alternative policies targeted at securing livelihoods for small-
holders need to be aware of the dynamics described here. Classic advocacy strategies
tend to target land reform. Whether the vexed question of land reform can ever be
resolved,24 an associated issue is of more pressing concern to local livelihoods: state
policy supports large-scale acquisitions linked with international investment
associated with commodity booms, together with green agendas, while insuﬃciently
addressing the structural constraints that limit smallholder production. Advocates
for alternative policies might strongly question arrangements that seek to attract
large-scale investors with the oﬀer of ‘free’ land or forest. Given the increasing value
of land, the state is arguably in a much stronger bargaining position to set the terms
of investment in agrarian and forested landscapes in ways that support smallholder
inclusion. However, as the four cases in this paper suggest, Indonesia has yet to see
the political conditions that might ensure that state-based actors pursue policies
that explicitly privilege the interests of local smallholders and agricultural labourers.
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